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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Williams appeals from the district court's order dismissing his post-conviction
petition.

On appeal, Mr. Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion

when it denied his request for the appointment of post-conviction counsel.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Williams pleaded

guilty to possession

of a controlled

substance,

methamphetamine. State v. Williams, Unpublished Opinion 312, p.1 (Ct. App. April 9,
2013). 1 The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed,
and retained jurisdiction. Id. Upon review of Mr. Williams' period of retained jurisdiction
(hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentence and placed him on

probation. Id.
While Mr. Williams was on probation in the First Case, he was charged with
stalking in the first degree in the Second Case.

Id. at 1-2.

In the Second Case,

Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to stalking in the first degree and the district court imposed a
concurrent unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed. Id. at 2. In the First

This opinion deals with a two consolidated appeals. While the record in this matter
primarily focuses with the criminal matter that began in 2010 (CR 2010-12830; Supreme
Court docket number 39541 ), this brief will include the facts and procedural posture of a
companion 2007 case (CR 2007-1783; Supreme Court docket number 39540), as it is
not entirely clear from record in this matter if Mr. Williams' post-conviction petition
relates to one or both of these cases. For example, the first page of the petition only
references CR 2010-12830. (R., p.8.) However, the second page of the petition
references the Supreme Court docket numbers for both cases. (R., p.9.) Additionally,
this brief will refer to CR 2007-1783 as the "First Case" and CR 2010-12830 as the
"Second Case."
1

1

Case, the district court revoked probation. Id. It retained jurisdiction in both cases. Id.
After his second rider, the district court suspended the sentences and placed
Mr. V\/illiams on probation in both cases. Id.
Mr. Williams' probation agreement required him to comply with all of the terms of
probation imposed by his probation officer. (R., p.22.) Mr. Williams' probation officer
imposed terms of probation which were created to supervise those on probation for
felony domestic battery. (R., p.13.) Eventually, the State alleged that he had violated
the terms of probation imposed by his probation officer. (R., p.13.) After an evidentiary
hearing, the district court found that Mr. Williams had violated the terms of his probation
imposed by his probation officer when he left a voice message threatening to cut
another person's throat. 2 (R., pp.22-23.) The district court revoked probation in both
cases. (R., p.23; Williams, Unpublished Opinion 312, p.2 (Ct. App. April 9, 2013).)
Mr. Williams then filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to his probation officer's imposition of the conditions of
felony domestic battery probation. (R., pp.8-14.) In addition, Mr. Williams filed a motion
requesting the appointment of counsel, supported by his claim of indigency. (R., pp.1520.) The district court denied Mr. Williams' request for counsel and entered a notice of
intent to dismiss Mr. Williams' post-conviction petition.

(R., pp.21-31.)

Mr. Williams

then filed an amended petition, wherein he made additional post-conviction claims.
(R., pp.42-58.) In that petition, Mr. Williams indicated that he was going to proceed pro

se but reserved

the ability to challenge the district court's denial of his request for post-

2

The district court also found that Mr. Williams violated the terms of his probation by
consuming alcohol and violating a no contact order. (R., pp.22-23.)

2

conviction counsel on appeal. (R., p.44.) Various motions were filed by both parties
and the district court ultimately dismissed Mr. Williams' petition. (R., pp.114-115, 128.)
Mr. Williams timely appealed. (R., pp.116-121.)
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ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Williams' motion for
appointment of post-conviction counsel?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Williams' Motion For
Appointment Of Post-Conviction Counsel

A.

Introduction
Mr. Williams contends that his post-conviction petition, along with its supporting

materials, satisfies the standard for appointment of counsel because it raises the
possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, Mr. Williams' requests that, assuming his case is
remanded, this Court order the district court to appoint counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is

governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the
UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act], a court-appointed attorney 'may be
made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. The
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion
of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004).
"When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within
the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (quoting Associates

Norlhwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603,605 (Ct. App.1987)).

5

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Williams' Motion
Requesting The Appointment Of Counsel Because He Alleged Facts Which
Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Williams did not waive or forfeit his ability to

challenge the district court's denial of his motion requesting the appointment of postconviction counsel. In his amended petition, Mr. Williams indicated that he was going to
pursue the remainder of his post-conviction proceedings pro se. (R., p.44.) However,
Mr. Williams expressly reserved his right to address the district court's denial of his
request for the appointment of counsel on appeal. (R., p.44.)
A post-conviction petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the
trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous."

Charboneau,

140 Idaho at 792 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001)). In order to avoid
frivolity finding, a pro se petitioner must allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid
claim.

Id. at 793 (emphasis added). This is a low standard, as a prose petitioner "may

not know the essential elements of a claim, potentially meritorious petitions may be
conclusory and incomplete." Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009). "[l]f facts
are alleged giving rise to the possibility of a valid claim, the trial court should appoint
counsel in order to give the petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and properly
allege the necessary supporting facts." Id. (original emphasis). "[E]very inference must
run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts."

Charboneau, 140

Idaho at 792.
In his initial petition, Mr. Williams claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the imposition of felony domestic battery probation conditions by his
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probation officer. (R., pp.10, 27.) In support of this claim, Mr. Williams provided an
affidavit stating that his probation officer required him to agree to "sign an agreement for
felony domestic batterers, even though [he had] never been charged with or convicted
of that crime."

(R., p.13.)

Mr. Williams then stated that he brought this to his trial

counsel before his probation was revoked for violating the terms of the felony domestic
battery probation agreement, but his attorney did not bring that fact to the district court's
attention. (R., pp.13-14.)
The district court provided the following rationale when it denied Mr. Williams'
request for the appointment of counsel:
[Mr. Williams] has not identified any evidence to support his claim.
This hindsight appraisal of his attorney's strategic and tactical decision is
insufficient to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. It would
have been a complete waste of time to contest a term imposed by his
probation officer when the very first term of probation imposed by this
Court allowed the probation officer to impose additional terms like the
felony domestic battery probation terms. Defendant counsel's strategic
decision to allocate time to more fruitful ventures will not be secondguessed by this Court. Additionally, [Mr. Williams] has only provided this
Court with a bare assertion that if he had not been placed on felony
domestic battery probation his probation violation would not have resulted
in a reinstatement of his sentence.
(R., p.27.)

Mr. Williams argues that the foregoing analysis is flawed for several reasons.
First, the district court, without any citations to the record in this matter, made factual
inferences against Mr. Williams contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that
every inference must be made in favor of a pro se petitioner requesting the appointment
of counsel. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. Specifically, the district court inferred that
trial counsel's decision to forego challenging the imposition of the conditions of
probation was strategic. This conclusion requires multiple inferences. First, the district
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court inferred trial counsel was aware of the imposition of the new terms of probation
and also inferred that trial counsel made a conscious decision to forego challenging
those terms of probation.

Since the district court had no evidence that trial counsel

made a conscious decision to forego challenging the felony domestic battery probation,
it should have assumed there was no tactical reason for counsel's failure to challenge
the new terms of probation. Had post-conviction counsel been appointed, that attorney
could have possibly developed facts which refute the district court's conclusion that trial
counsel's failure to challenge the imposition of felony domestic battery probation was a
tactical decision.
The second flaw in the district court decision to deny the appointment of counsel
was the court's determination that it would have been pointless to challenge the
imposition of the terms of probation because the district court allowed Mr. Williams'
probation officer from to add terms of probation. Just because the terms of probation
were potentially imposed in a legal manner did not preclude Mr. Williams' from
challenging them as being unreasonable. For example, in recognizing that trial courts
have broad discretion to impose the terms of probation, Idaho appellate courts have
long recognized that, as in any other exercise of discretion, a trial courts exercise of
discretion is not unfettered and can be challenged. State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841,
843 (1987). One means by which a defendant can challenge the terms of probation is
by arguing that they are not reasonably related to the sentencing goals of societal
protection and rehabilitation. State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 810 (Ct. App. 2002). In
this case, Mr. Williams was essentially claiming that his terms of probation were not
reasonably related to rehabilitation because he was never convicted of felony domestic
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battery and, as such, they were not reasonably related to his underlying conviction.
(R., pp.8-14.)

Turning to the third flaw in the district court's reasoning, Mr. Williams did provide
facts which support his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
imposition of felony domestic battery probation. As previously mentioned, Mr. Williams
pointed out that he was not convicted of felony domestic battery and that the terms of
his probation were geared toward rehabilitation of a domestic batterer. (R., pp.8-14.) It
is apparent from the record that Mr. Williams asserted facts which supported his claim
that the terms of felony probation were not reasonably related to his underlying
conviction.

And since that is a legal basis to challenge the terms of probation,

Mr. Williams did present facts which give rise to a possibly valid claim. Therefore, the
district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Williams' request for the
appointment of counsel.
In sum, Mr. Williams does not need to allege facts which establish a valid claim in
order to have counsel appointed. To the contrary, he need only establish facts which
give rise to the possibility of a valid claim. Here, Mr. Williams claimed his attorney was
ineffective for failing to challenge the imposition of felony domestic battery probation
conditions and, in support of that claim, he alleged that he had never been convicted of
felony domestic battery. He raised the possibility of a valid claim because a probationer
can challenge a term of probation if it is not reasonably related to that protection of
society and rehabilitation. Additionally, the district court erroneously drew an inference
against Mr. Williams when it assumed that trial counsel's failure to object to the
imposition of those terms of probation was based on a tactical decision by trial counsel.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
summarily dismissing his petition and remand his case for further proceedings and with
an instruction that counsel be appointed.
DATED this 22 nd day of October, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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